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Abstract
The literature holds that coalition-building parties prefer the policy distance 
of coalition partners to be as small as possible. In light of continued impor-
tance of religion in electoral politics cross-nationally, the distance argument 
is worrisome for minorities seeking political access because many minorities 
are of different religion than the majority representatives forming coalitions. 
The authors suggest plurality parties’ objectives to demonstrate inclusive-
ness outweigh the concern over policy distance. They test their hypotheses 
on a sample of all electorally active ethnic minorities in democracies from 
1945 to 2004. The authors find support for their hypothesis that ethnic par-
ties representing minorities that diverge in religious family from the majority 
are more likely to be included in governing coalitions than are ethnic minori-
ties at large. It is interesting, however, that they also find that minority parties 
representing ethnic groups that differ in denomination from the majority are 
less likely to be included in governing coalitions.
Keywords
religion, coalition politics, ethnic minorities
What is the role of religion in determining ethnic minority access to execu-
tive coalitions in democracies worldwide? Do majority politicians eschew 
or appeal strategically to ethnic minorities representing distinct religious 
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constituencies? Do politicians seek conflict or cooperation across religious 
affiliations? These are only a few of the questions that remain unanswered 
because political science has paid little attention to the role of religion in 
politics (Wald & Wilcox, 2006, p. 523).1
At the same time religion is important in daily politics worldwide. This 
importance is exemplified by incidents such as the controversial election of 
the arguably Islamist Justice and Development Party to lead the Turkish gov-
ernment in 2002. Similarly, recent uproar in the United States over Republican 
National Committee chairman Michael Steele’s comments about abortion 
and gay marriage decisions demonstrates the importance of religion to the 
constituency of a purportedly secular party.
Although it is relatively silent on the question of religion, in the literature 
on coalition politics
almost all theory-building efforts have at their core the basic spatial-
voting assumption that “distance counts.” The distance in question is 
that between a party’s position and the position of the government or 
proposed government, and the assumption simply states that parties 
prefer this distance to be as small as possible (ceteris paribus). 
(Warwick, 2005, p. 383)
If true, the distance argument in the context of continued importance of reli-
gion in politics is worrisome for ethnic minorities seeking political access 
because many minorities are of a different religion than the majority repre-
sentatives forming coalitions.
This article asks what effect ethnic minority constituency religion has on 
the probability that the minority joins an executive coalition. The precise 
mode of ethnic minority access to the executive varies from country to coun-
try and can occur through both an ethnic minority party and a nonminority 
party. In presidential regimes the executive consists of the president and the 
president’s cabinet. This type of executive coalition is by definition a major-
ity coalition. The executive is generally elected by majority but may include 
members of specific minority groups in the cabinet.2 In the United States, for 
example, the first Hispanic member in a presidential cabinet was Lauro F. 
Cavazos, a Democrat who served as Secretary of Education in the Reagan 
administration from 1988 to 1990. In addition, ethnic minorities in presiden-
tial systems can be included as representatives of ethnic minority parties. 
For example, in 2007 President Chavez created a new Ministry of Indigenous 
Affairs and appointed as its minister the former president of the National 
Indigenous Confederation of Venezuela (CONIVE), Nicia Maldonado.
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In parliamentary regimes, the executive consists of the prime minister 
and the prime minister’s cabinet. Generally speaking parliamentary execu-
tives are coalitions only if the largest party holds a plurality rather than 
majority. Ethnic minorities can be included in the cabinet as representatives 
of ethnic minority or nonminority parties. Ethnic minorities may also access 
the executive through the plurality party. For example, in Estonia, ethnic 
Russians were represented in the parliament through the Estonian Center 
Party, which formed the cabinet after the 2003 elections. In the remainder of 
the article, we use the term majority to refer to the ethnic majority constitu-
ency whose representative majority/plurality party controls the executive in 
either presidential or parliamentary regimes. This is in contrast to the ethnic 
minority whose minority party access (or whose access through a nonminor-
ity party) is the focus of the article.
The electoral literature, by and large, supports the notion that although 
industrialized and postindustrialized countries may have undergone consid-
erable political secularization, religion is still a very important determinant 
of people’s electoral behavior (Broughton & Napel, 2000; Layman & Green, 
2005; Norris & Inglehart, 2004). The literature on coalitions also suggests 
that religion is an important policy issue for coalition formation (Gryzmala-
Busse, 2001). Generally speaking, the conventional wisdom in this literature 
is that coalition-building parties prefer to work with other parties whose 
policy positions most closely align with their own (Warwick, 2005). 
However, there is no systematic work on precisely how religion affects eth-
nic minority probability of access across countries. Furthermore, the coali-
tion literature provides little guidance as to how minority religious distance 
translates into policy distance. For this reason, we examine the power-sharing 
literature and the literature on American and European electoral politics 
(Broughton & Napel, 2000; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Higham, 1955/2008; 
Layman & Green, 2005; Lijphart, 1977) where the idea of whether and how 
religious distance translates into policy distance is discussed in more detail.
Building on these literatures, we propose some testable hypotheses about 
the effect of minority religion on the probability that the minority is included 
in governing coalitions. Specifically, we propose that ethnic minority diver-
gence from the majority in religious family or denomination affects the 
majority’s willingness to form a coalition with the minority. We test the 
implications of our theory on ethnic minority access to legislative coalitions 
across democracies worldwide from 1945 to 2004.
Contrary to the coalition distance argument, our empirical results suggest 
that with respect to minority religion, greater distance is better. In particular, 
we find that majority politicians favor a strong signal that allows them to 
 at Bilkent University on May 7, 2014cps.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
6  Comparative Political Studies 46(1)
demonstrate their commitment to religious diversity. Thus, parties represent-
ing ethnic minorities who belong to different religious families than the 
majority are more likely to join executive coalitions than are ethnic minori-
ties at large. However, ethnic parties representing minorities whose religion 
differs only in denomination from majorities are less likely to join governing 
coalitions than are ethnic minorities at large.
The article is organized into four parts. First, we briefly survey the perti-
nent literature with a special emphasis on defining the terms and concepts 
used. In particular, we pay close attention to the discussion of whether and 
how religious distance translates into policy distance. Second, the article lays 
out the hypotheses to be tested. The third section follows with a presentation 
of the variables and the results. We then discuss the implications of our find-
ings in the context of current literatures. We conclude by suggesting a research 
agenda that examines further the distinctions between divergent religious 
divides and how these overlap with other cleavages in the society to affect a 
range of political outcomes.
Literature and Theory
This section discusses the general importance of religion in electoral politics 
with a particular emphasis on party types and policy distance and suggests 
some testable hypotheses about the possible impact of religion on minority 
access to government.
The electoral literature posits that throughout the development of democra-
cies, religion has been instrumental in politics and that religious public policy 
agendas are promoted through party politics (Kalyvas, 1996; Safran, 2003). In 
summarizing the effect of religion from a number of case studies of European 
electoral behavior, Broughton and Napel (2000, p. 203) point out that in 
empirical analysis of European electorates, “religious effects on voting, even 
if weakening over time and affecting fewer people than in the past, remain 
apparent after various statistical controls for other variables have been carried 
out.” Similarly, in the United States, religion remains an important determi-
nant of voters’ political views (Layman & Green, 2005), and legislators 
take constituency religion into account when voting on issues (Rosenson, 
Oldmixon, & Wald, 2009). Cross-regional studies suggest the same. Although 
industrialized and postindustrialized countries have recently undergone con-
siderable political secularization, religion is still a very important determinant 
of people’s voting behavior (Norris & Inglehart, 2004).3
It is important that the effect of religion in electoral politics—and by logi-
cal extension in coalition politics—does not necessarily occur through 
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self-identified religious parties. In contrast, the effect of religion may take 
the form of consistent support for nominally secular parties that are aligned 
with a religious establishment (Wittenberg, 2006). Indeed, Rosenblum 
(2003) defines a “religious party” as any party that “[appeals] to voters on 
religious grounds and [draws its] inspiration from religious values” (p. 25). 
In this article, we follow Rosenblum’s lead in considering any party as reli-
gious that systematically caters to the religion of its constituency but does 
not necessarily self-identify as a religious party.
Moreover, Rosenblum (2003, p. 31) argues that the
distinction between religious parties and religious party organizations 
allied to secular parties is not crucial, so long as religious political 
groups are constituent elements of the party as demonstrated by candi-
date recruitment, platforms and programs, strategy, coalition building, 
and so on.
Consequently, in defining the pertinent manifestation of religion for coalition 
politics, we focus on the religion of a represented social group rather than the 
political parties themselves.
The idea that social group characteristics rather than party self-labeling 
define broader societal and political understanding of ethnic minority party 
attributes is extremely important. This is particularly true when considering 
the majority party strategy of including ethnic minorities in the executive 
coalition or excluding them. It is possible that, in the view of the majority, 
some ethnic minority parties successfully distance themselves from reli-
gious views of their ethnic constituency. More commonly, however, we 
posit that the majorities’ view of ethnic minority religion and religiosity 
does not distinguish the minority party position from the overall position of 
the ethnic minority it represents. Balad, the Arab nationalist party in Israel, 
is a stark example of a party that (rightly or wrongly) cannot distance itself 
from radical elements in the minority Arab population in the state (Smooha, 
1997, p. 224). Since the party’s founding, the leadership has continually 
proclaimed its commitment to peacefully advocating for the rights of the 
Arab minority through democratic politics; however, the party has continu-
ally been accused of aiding and abetting extremists.4
Furthermore, majority builders of all executive coalitions must take into 
account the religious preferences of their own constituents—even when the 
builder is a self-proclaimed secular party. For example, in the United States, 
the Democratic Party is historically thought to cater more to minorities than 
the Republican Party. Nevertheless, the majority population of the United 
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States is Protestant. Consequently, all administrations in the United States, 
including the Democrats, represent (and have to appeal to) the majority of 
Protestants.
Although the above literature examines the effect of religion on politics 
broadly, very little is written specifically regarding the effect of religion on 
access to the executive. This is a serious omission because voters who, 
through representation in the legislature but not in the government, “have 
their views advocated but never acted upon may not feel very well repre-
sented” (Cox, 1997, p. 227).5 Enactment occurs in the executive following 
political bargaining that determines who gets access. In or aligned with the 
government, groups can bargain over policy proposed by their coalition part-
ners and get some of their own policy objectives passed into law.
We do know quite a bit about the general workings of coalition formation 
in the legislature. For example, we know that when a coalition forms in a 
decision-making body, the winning coalition tends to be as small as possible 
(Dodd, 1976; Riker, 1962). We also know that in constructing a minimum 
winning coalition parties care about policy (Axelrod, 1970; De Swaan, 1973) 
and that minor parties matter (Sartori, 1976). Furthermore, the conventional 
wisdom holds that coalition builders prefer to minimize policy distance when 
choosing partners (Warwick, 2005).
A remaining question is how religious distance maps onto the idea of pol-
icy distance and the concomitant probability of minority inclusion in the 
coalition. According to Arend Lijphart (1977), religious differences embody 
one of many possible political segments that define plural or diverse societ-
ies. Lijphart further explains that political conflict depends on the degree to 
which policy segments overlap or crosscut:
If for example, the religious cleavage and the social class cleavage 
cross cut to a high degree, the different religious groups will tend to 
feel equal. If, on the other hand, the two cleavages tend to coincide, 
one of the groups is bound to feel resentment over its inferior status. 
(p. 75)
Lijphart also notes that even when cleavages crosscut, certain cleavages, 
such as religion, may constitute an “overarching loyalty” that fosters cohe-
sion vis-à-vis other segments in society (pp. 81-83).
Thus, in societies where religion is one of several mutually reinforcing 
cleavages or where religion constitutes an overarching loyalty, the potential 
for political conflict is higher. To ameliorate the increased conflict potential 
Lijphart proposes the power-sharing arrangement of consociationalism.6 The 
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theory was developed with respect to countries such as the Netherlands and 
Belgium, but Lijphart also gives the example of a power-sharing arrangement 
that was temporarily successful in Lebanon.7 It is interesting that the content 
of the religious divide differs substantially in this sample, from Catholics and 
Calvinists in the Netherlands to Muslims and Maronite Christians in Lebanon. 
Therefore, the implication is that irrespective of doctrinal content, the effect 
of religious distance on increasing political distance is functionally equiva-
lent in the above cases.
By and large, the subsequent body of research on power-sharing and con-
flict supports the view that identity-related issues such as religion increase 
and deepen issue divides between groups (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003, 2007; 
Hartzell, Hoddie, & Rothchild, 2001; Kaufmann, 1996–1997; Lijphart, 1996; 
Sisk, 1996). Furthermore, this research does not differentiate between the 
divisive effects of different types of religious differences (family or denomi-
nation) that power-sharing arrangements aim to ameliorate.
The American electoral literature, in turn, offers two views of how reli-
gious distance maps onto policy distance. Both perspectives highlight con-
text dependence, and much like the theory about power sharing, the early 
American electoral literature emphasizes doctrinal differences between 
sects as a source of policy distance. In contrast, the contemporary literature 
highlights differences in orthodoxy within sects.
For example, Higham (1955/2008, p. 82) explains that in the late 19th 
century and again in the early 20th century American Republican Protestant 
nativists railed against Catholic immigrants as the instruments of “papal sub-
version.” Catholic Irish and later Italian immigrants were claimed set to 
replace American Protestants in the labor market and overthrow “American 
institutions” (p. 82). Along the lines of the idea of overlapping segments in 
the power-sharing literature, Higham suggests that much of the anti-Catholic 
sentiment overlapped with a class conflict and “often lacked genuine reli-
gious feeling” (p. 182). The conflict was essentially a reaction to the increas-
ing political power of Catholics.
However, immigration at that time was largely European, so the available 
religious distinction was necessarily between sects. It is not clear, therefore, 
that in American politics the nature of sectoral differences inevitably gener-
ates greater policy distance than religious family distance. Indeed, the recent 
anti-Muslim sentiment in the United States (Rodriguez, 2008) suggests this is 
not the case. Rather, consistent with the power-sharing literature, it appears 
that in American politics religious distance, both sectoral and between reli-
gious families, increases policy distance. However, the relevant religious 
dimensions and specific policy issues contested vary over time.
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The notion that religious policy distance is highly context dependent is 
supported by current American theorizing about religion and politics; how-
ever, the emphasis has changed from inter- to intrareligious divides. Following 
Hunter (1991), Layman and Greene (2005) argue that although the idea of 
culture wars is exaggerated, voters’ religious orthodoxy and commitment are 
the relevant dimensions to consider in contemporary American politics. 
Layman and Greene define religious “orthodoxy” relative to religious “pro-
gressivism,” and they posit the “former is characterized by a commitment to 
external, definable, and transcendent sources of moral authority, while the 
latter adheres to a relativistic view of moral authority which changes with 
historical circumstances and the boundaries of human knowledge” (p. 62). 
To test the effect of orthodoxy on American politics, Layman and Green use 
an index of “Catholic Traditionalism,” which they create by using survey 
responses such as “praying the Rosary, confessing to a priest, and believing 
that the Pope is infallible” (p. 68).
The same line of thinking is found in the current European electoral lit-
erature. Broughton and Napel (2000, p. 203), for example, highlight that in 
Germany and France differences in political preference depend to some 
degree on the extent to which a voter is “integrated into their church” rather 
than on the “purely denominational division between Protestants and 
Catholics.” Gryzmala-Busse (2001, p. 90) adds that after economics, “the 
second dimension in East Central Europe runs along a spectrum from secular/
cosmopolitan/liberal to religious/nationalist/authoritarian stances. This 
world-view dimension dominated the political discourse in Poland from 
1991 to 1992 over questions of abortion and religion in schools.”
Taking together what we know about minority group religious tradition 
and coalition politics, and the insights from these literatures about religion 
and policy distance, what then are our expectations for ethnic minority exec-
utive access as a function of the group’s religion? Strom (1990) argues that 
all parties make a cost–benefit calculation in deciding whether to accept an 
invitation to join a coalition. We assume that such strategic thinking applies 
to both the majority/plurality parties inviting minority parties into their 
coalition and the ethnic minority parties deciding whether to accept an invi-
tation. However, since the executive is the route to influence over legislation 
and policy, we also conjecture that in democracies, politically organized eth-
nic minority constituencies aim predominantly to access the executive.8 
Therefore, the majority/plurality party’s strategy regarding whom to invite 
into the coalition is likely more variable, and our hypotheses are formulated 
with an eye to this actor.
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All ethnic groups, majorities and minorities alike, have a predominant 
religion, though not all members of the group necessarily adhere to that reli-
gion. The majority party can, therefore, represent a majority group whose 
religion differs from or is the same as the religion of the ethnic minority that 
aspires for inclusion in the executive.
The remaining question concerns the majority’s cost–benefit calculation 
regarding possible inclusion of ethnic minorities belonging to different reli-
gious traditions and policy distance. The current notion in the American and 
the European electoral literature about how religious distance maps onto pol-
icy distance between groups (Broughton & Napel, 2000; Gryzmala-Busse, 
2001; Layman & Greene, 2005) points to the null hypothesis in this research: 
If the relevant religious dimension is only orthodoxy within religious families 
and sects, we do not expect to see systematic differences in the inclusion into 
coalitions of ethnic minorities as differentiated from the majority by religious 
family or denomination.
In contrast, Higham’s (1955/2008) and Lijphart’s (1977) arguments about 
how religious distance relates to policy distance, or those of the more recent 
power-sharing literature, are arguments of religious divergence as a proxy for 
increased policy distance between groups in competition over the relative shares 
of resources. Furthermore, coalition theory postulates that majority parties pre-
fer coalition partners who are closer in policy. Thus, where religious cleavages 
are not substantially crosscut and in the absence of consociational institutions, 
this would lead to the expectation that minorities whose religion differs from the 
majority are less likely to be included in governing coalitions than are minorities 
who share a religion with the coalition forming majority. Thus, we propose,
Hypothesis 1: Differences between majority and ethnic minority con-
stituency religious traditions decrease the chances that a government-
forming plurality party includes the ethnic minority in the executive 
coalition.
At the same time, Kellam (2007) suggests that the majority party’s interests 
are restricted to specific dimensions. Furthermore, she argues that as long as a 
minority party policy distance is close on the dimensions that the majority 
party anticipates legislating, the party leaders are willing to ignore minority 
divergent positions on other policies. It stands to reason, therefore, that if a 
coalition building party (representing the ethnic majority) does not perceive 
religion as one of the dimensions on which it foresees legislating, a minority 
coalition partner’s religious identity may not matter to the majority party.
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Moreover, at least in theory, the nature of democracy is pluralist and inclu-
sive. If minority religion is not an obstacle for access to the executive, a clear 
signal that a majority party practices inclusion by reaching out to distinct 
constituencies in coalition building probably plays well on average with core 
constituents of that party. This is likely true for included ethnic minority 
groups that share a common religious tradition with the majority (demon-
strating willingness to reach across ethnic lines) and even more so if the eth-
nic minority also belongs to a different religious tradition than the majority.
Last but not least, the proposed solution in the power-sharing literature to 
the political conflict created by religious cleavages is to include representa-
tives of all relevant cleavages in the government (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; 
Lijphart, 1977). Majority politicians likely recognize the stabilizing effects of 
minority representation and reach out to religious minorities when building 
governing coalitions. Consequently, we propose,
Hypothesis 2: Differences between the majority and ethnic minority con-
stituency religious traditions improve the chances that a government-
forming majority/plurality party includes the ethnic minority in the 
executive coalition.
Testing the Effect of Religion
The Data
The specific implications we are testing in this article pertain to the relative 
effect that the content of one ethnic minority’s religion has on the group’s 
ability to achieve access to government vis-à-vis other ethnic minorities.9 
The data we use in our tests are pooled cross-sections from executive elec-
tion years in all democracies from 1945 to 2004. The unit of analysis is the 
electorally active ethnic minority in a given country, following an election. 
For each country, the number of cases per election year equals the number of 
electorally active ethnic minority groups in that country. Each case (minority 
group) is coded as 0 if it is not included in the executive coalition at any point 
after election T and before election T + 1, and 1 if the group is included in 
the coalition in any year after the first election and before the second.10
Our data combine and modify variables from two existing data sets. For 
information on ethnic minority access to government (and for the operation-
alization of democracy), we use data from Ethnicity and Electoral Politics 
(Birnir, 2007). These data record minority group access to government 
through ethnic and nonethnic parties, for all electorally active ethnic groups, 
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in all democracies since 1945. In addition, Birnir surveyed all electorally 
active groups that passed the population threshold established by Minorities 
at Risk (MAR) but that were missing from the original MAR data. Following 
that survey, we added countries to our data for a total of 97 groups in 52 
democracies.11
The second set of data we rely on is detailed coding of religious minority 
and majority group creeds and denominations by Fox (2002, 2004). Our orig-
inal contribution to this coding is to code the context of majority/minority 
group religious identity combination variables by country. The variables are 
described in greater detail below.
The Dependent Variables: Ethnic  
Minority Access to Government
In defining access to governing coalitions, we follow Birnir (2007), who 
defines the pertinent governing coalition as the executive coalition. The vari-
ables we use record the electorally active ethnic minority’s access (or lack of 
access) to the following executive elections. This variable records two types 
of access. An ethnic minority party may have explicit and formal access to 
the cabinet such as the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) in 
Bulgaria,12 which is an ethnic Turkish minority party that got into a coalition 
government in 2001. Alternatively, a member of the ethnic minority group 
may hold an official position in a nonminority party that is in the cabinet. For 
example, this was the case for Catalans when Josep Piqué i Camps, a repre-
sentative of the Spanish Partido Popular (Popular Party or People’s Party), 
served as the minister for foreign affairs from 2000 to 2002.13
In the original data, access variables are coded as the number of years 
since the ethnic group has been in the cabinet.14 We are interested in the 
divergent probabilities of access between ethnic groups at any given time. 
Thus, we have recoded access as a binary variable that records the instances 
when an ethnic group is in the coalition representing either an ethnic minority 
party or a nonminority party.15 We examine the probability of each type of 
access (through ethnic party or a nonethnic party) separately. The group 
enters into the data set when an ethnic party runs in an election and remains 
in the data as long as the ethnic party runs. Alternatively, where there are no 
ethnic parties, the group enters into the data when a member of the ethnic 
group represents a nonethnic party in the executive and remains in the data as 
long as the nonethnic party runs in elections. In a few countries, such as the 
United States, ethnic minorities are represented only through nonethnic par-
ties. Consequently, we have a greater number of observations (572) for the 
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variable indicating access through nonethnic parties than for the variable 
accounting for access through ethnic parties (444).
The Independent Variables: Religious  
Identity (family and denomination)
Fox (2002, 2004) provides an extensive classification of minority religious 
affiliations. If 80% of the ethnic minority subscribes to a different religion than 
the majority, Fox classifies the group as adhering to a minority religion. This 
difference includes both divergent families of religion and divergent denomi-
nations within the same family of religion. Supplementing Fox (2002, 2004) 
with the World Directory of Minorities (Minority Rights Group International, 
1997) we examined religious family and denominations of each ethnic minor-
ity group in our data.16 The divergent religious families we record are Animism, 
Baha’i, Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam, Jainism, 
Judaism, Shinto, Sikhism, Taoism, and Zoroastrianism.17
Our objective, in this article, is to account for the religious context sur-
rounding the ethnic minority group’s bid to access the executive. Consequently, 
drawing on our classification of ethnic group religious families, we also 
coded a binary variable that accounts for whether the ethnic minority reli-
gious family is the same or differs from the ethnic majority religion.18 For 
example, in Israel the ethnic majority is Jewish whereas the Arab minority is 
mostly Muslim. The Arab minority in Israel is, therefore, coded as belonging 
to a different religious family than the majority of Israelis. Hispanics in the 
United States, in contrast, are predominantly Christian Catholic, thus belong-
ing to the same religious family as the majority Christian Protestants.
Second, we are interested in divergent majority–minority denominations 
within each religious family (e.g., Sunni and Shi’i in Islam, or Catholic, 
Protestant, Orthodox, and Anglican in Christianity). Therefore, we also clas-
sified each minority in the data according to denomination. Next, we coded a 
binary variable accounting for the denomination of each minority vis-à-vis 
the majority in each country. This variable is coded as 1 only if the minority 
belongs to the same religious family but different denomination than the 
majority. For example, in Northern Ireland Catholics belong to a different 
denomination than the majority Protestants. Conversely, mostly Sunni 
Muslim Kurds in Turkey belong to the same denomination as the ethnic 
majority of Sunni Muslim Turks.
Table 1 lists the religious combinations that we coded.19 As the table shows, 
in only two categories do electorally active minorities share a family but differ 
in denomination from the majority. These categories are Christian/Christian 
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and Islam/Islam. In many more cases, the majority and the minority belong to 
different religious families. In three cases (Bangladesh, Bolivia, and Venezuela) 
minorities subscribe to both different and the same religious families as the 
majority. In Bolivia and Venezuela, some of the indigenous population are 
Shamanist but most are Catholic and were coded as belonging to the same fam-
ily and denomination as the majority. In Bangladesh, however, the Chittagong 
Hill tribes include both Muslim and Hindu populations. Furthermore, Muslim 
Chittagongs are Shi’i, whereas the ethnic majority in Bangladesh is Sunni. 
Consequently, the Chittagong Hill tribes are coded as belonging to both a dif-
ferent family and a different denomination than the majority.
Table 1. Countries Where Majority/Minorities Adhere to Different Religious 
Families and/or Different Denominations
Majority religious 
family (and 
denomination if same 
family as minority)
Minority religious family (and 
denomination if minority belongs 
to the same family as the majority 
but a different denomination) Countries
Christianity (Catholic, 
Protestant, 
Orthodox)
Christianity (Catholic, Protestant, 
Orthodox)
Belgium, Canada, Croatia, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovakia, Trinidad 
Tobago, United Kingdom, 
United States, Yugoslavia
Christianity Shamanism Bolivia, Venezuela
Christianity Islam Bulgaria, Cyprus, Georgia, 
Germany, Greece, 
Macedonia, Malawi, South 
Africa, Yugoslavia
Christianity Hinduism South Africa, Trinidad Tobago
Christianity Buddhism United States
Islam (Sunni, Shi’i) Islam (Sunni, Shi’i) Bangladesh
Islam Christianity Albania, Bosnia, Nigeria
Islam Hinduism Bangladesh
Islam Buddhism Bangladesh, Indonesia
Hinduism Islam India
Hinduism Christianity India
Hinduism Sikhism India
Hinduism Animism India, Nepal
Hinduism Buddhism Nepal
Buddhism Islam Thailand
Buddhism Hinduism Sri Lanka
Judaism Islam Israel
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The numbers of cases in each religious category are too low to compare 
the effects of specific creed or denomination combinations. However, we aim 
to elucidate more generally whether divergence in family or denomination 
matters for minority access to executive coalitions. Consequently, the follow-
ing analysis accounts only for the variables we coded to account for divergent 
combinations of majority/minority religious family and divergent denomina-
tions in a given country.
Control Variables
Little is written about the grievances of religious minority groups that are not 
related specifically to religion (see Fox, 2002, for an exception). There is, 
however, good reason to believe that all ethnic minority groups are also 
affected by exogenous constraints such as national institutions and economic 
conditions. Indeed, if Varshney (2002) and Wilkinson (2004) are correct, 
external influences account for a large part of seemingly religious grievances.
However, institutions are a widely cited constraint of ethnic access. In the 
power-sharing literature institutions also serve to guarantee ethnic access. We 
do not control separately for power-sharing arrangements because those 
arrangements take many different forms (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003). In fact, 
according to Lijphart (1996), a country can practice power sharing without 
formally adopting consociational institutions.
Instead, since access to the legislature influences the probability of access 
to the governing coalition, we control for some of the institutional factors 
most commonly cited in the literature on ethnic minorities as influencing 
group’s political access to the legislature (Birnir, 2007; Cohen, 1997; 
Horowitz, 1985, 1990; Lijphart, 1977; Saideman, Lanoue, Campenni, & 
Stanton, 2002). We include a variable accounting for presidential systems, in 
reference to parliamentary systems, and two electoral variables accounting 
for countries that use proportional representation and mixed electoral sys-
tems, in reference to countries that use a plurality or a majority electoral 
system.20 We expect minorities to have greater access to the executive through 
nonminority parties in presidential systems compared to parliamentary sys-
tems. We also expect minorities to have greater access through minority par-
ties under rules of proportional representation and in mixed systems, when 
compared to plurality systems.
Similarly, economic prosperity is related to group propensity for access 
(Cederman, Weidmann, & Gleditsch, in press; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Gurr, 
1985; Lipset, 1959). To measure economic effects, we include a variable 
accounting for GDP per capita,21 and we expect greater inclusion of minorities 
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in the executive as personal wealth increases. The second economic variable 
we include for control is a measure of aggregate growth of GDP per capita 
when compared to the prior year,22 and we expect access to decrease as growth 
contracts.23
Descriptive analysis of the data indicates that India is an outlier. The 
number of observations recorded of ethnic minority party access (or lack of 
access) in India is 72, compared to an average of 7 in the rest of the sample. 
This is in part a result of the great number of ethnic groups in India than in 
other countries. Similarly, the rate at which ethnic minority groups achieve 
access through ethnic minority parties in India (0.05) is quite different from 
the rate elsewhere (0.31). The corresponding numbers for rate of access 
through nonethnic parties (in India 0.18 vs. 0.21 in the rest of the sample) 
support the idea that ethnic groups have a lower probability of access in 
India than in the rest of the sample. Consequently, we include a control for 
India in the analysis.
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for all of the variables used in the 
analysis. The unit of analysis is the ethnic minority group in a country 
between any two elections. The dependent variables determine the total num-
ber of observations (572 for access to the executive through a nonminority 
party, and 444 for access through an ethnic party since ethnic parties do not 
compete in elections in all systems, or they compete in some elections but not 
all). Availability of the economic variables (554 for GDP per capita and 547 
for GDP per capita growth) restricts the sample further.
Results
Bivariate correlations, not reported here, suggest that the effect on minority 
access of divergence in religious family and denomination differs between 
nonethnic and ethnic parties. Table 3 examines the correlations in a more 
rigorous test using logit regression and controlling for other variables. The 
dependent variable in the first model in Table 3 is the binary variable indi-
cating whether the group gained access to the executive coalition through 
a minority party at any point between two elections. The first model 
includes all of the independent variables described above. When compar-
ing the second model to the first, the dependent variable changes to indi-
cate access through nonminority parties whereas the independent variables 
remain the same.
By and large, the logit analysis confirms that the effects of religious family 
diverge between minority and nonminority parties. Contrary to Hypothesis 1, 
that distance makes access less likely, and in support of Hypothesis 2, we find 
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that ethnic minorities whose religious family differs from the majority are 
significantly more likely to gain access through an ethnic party (one-tailed 
significance) than are minorities who share the same religious family with the 
majority. In contrast, the minority whose religious family differs from the 
majority is no more or less likely to gain access through a nonethnic party.
In addition, we examined access of minorities whose religious family is 
the same as the majority’s but differ in denomination. Here we also find a 
significant effect on representation of minority parties but the effect is nega-
tive. Minorities who differ in denomination from the majority are less likely 
to gain access to the executive. This lends some support to Hypothesis 1 and 
qualifies the expectations of Hypothesis 2, which suggests that politicians 
aim to reach across all religious boundaries. It appears that politicians reach 
across religious boundaries between families of religion, yet they do not 
extend their reach along a continuum within the same family of religion.
Consistent with expectations, proportional electoral systems significantly 
decrease the probability that ethnic minorities gain access through nonmi-
nority parties and are positively, though not significantly, related to access 
through minority parties. Mixed systems decrease the probability of access 
through either type of party when compared to plurality systems. It is 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics.
Variable Obs. M SD Min Max
Access through ethnic party 444 0.272 0.445 0 1
Access through nonethnic 
party
572 0.234 0.423 0 1
Minority religion is of a 
different family than the 
majority religion
572 0.316 0.465 0 1
Minority religious 
denomination differs from 
majority denomination
572 0.131 0.337 0 1
Proportional electoral 
system
572 0.433 0.496 0 1
Mixed electoral system 572 0.103 0.304 0 1
Presidential system 572 0.340 0.474 0 1
Real GDP per capita, 
current price
554 7685.728 8233.567 133.196 39722.25
Growth rate of real GDP 
per capita
547 2.464 5.996 -20.882 60.388
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interesting that, in presidential systems, minorities are significantly more 
likely to gain access through either minority or nonminority parties when 
compared to parliamentary systems.
Furthermore, greater personal wealth (measured as GDP per capita) sig-
nificantly increases the probability that ethnic minorities are included in 
government through nonminority parties. Growth rates, in turn, increase the 
probability that minorities are included through minority parties. Minorities 
in India are significantly less likely to access the executive through minority 
parties than are minorities elsewhere in the world but no less likely to access 
the executive through nonminority parties. The above results are robust to an 
alternate estimation method.
Table 3. Results
(2) (1)
 
Access through  
ethnic party
Access through nonethnic 
party
Minority religion is of a different 
family than the majority religion 
(different family of religion)a
0.448* (0.267) –0.243 (0.300)
Minority religious denomination 
differs from majority 
denominationb
–0.815* (0.452) –0.347 (0.328)
Proportional electoral systemc 0.279 (0.291) –1.369*** (0.263)
Mixed electoral systemc –1.270** (0.569) –1.298*** (0.419)
Presidential systemd 0.651** (0.288) 0.694*** (0.249)
Real gross domestic product per 
capita, current price
–1.96e–05 (2.33e–05) 9.25e–05*** (1.43e–05)
Growth rate of real GDP per 
capita
0.0572*** (0.0198) –0.00514 (0.0193)
India –2.214*** (0.575) 0.0386 (0.386)
Constant –1.128*** (0.298) –1.457*** (0.269)
Observations 423 547
Logit regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
a. Reference category is minority whose religion belongs to the same creed as the majority.
b. Reference category is minority whose denomination differs from the majority denomination 
within the same creed.
c. Reference category is a plurality electoral system.
d. Reference category is a parliamentary system.
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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One question that remains concerns the substantive importance of the 
above results. Coalition formation depends on a myriad of inputs in each 
country after each election. Therefore, we would not expect any individual 
variable to have a dramatic effect on either the probability of inclusion or the 
overall fit of the model. It is important that this is despite the common under-
standing that, for example, institutions and the economy matter to who gov-
erns. Consequently, we posit that the substantive importance of religion is 
most appropriately assessed relative to the effect of other variables that we 
consider important.
A common interpretation of the substantive significance of the results 
examines the change in probability of access for ethnic minorities associated 
with the individual coefficients of each significant explanatory variable, 
holding all other effects constant at their mean.24 It is important to remember 
that any such interpretation depends on the equation specified and should not 
be taken literally. The most important comparison is the magnitude changes 
associated with other variables that are commonly thought to matter.
Specifically, belonging to a different religious family than the majority 
increases the chances 8 percentage points that the group gains access through 
an ethnic party vis-à-vis other ethnic minorities. In contrast, belonging to a 
different denomination than the majority decreases the chances that a minor-
ity gains access through an ethnic party by 11 percentage points. To compare, 
a change from a parliamentary to presidential system increases the chances of 
minority representation through an ethnic party by 12 percentage points. A 
percentage-point change associated with religion rivaling the institutional 
effect is, we argue, undeniably and substantively important.
Another interpretation of substantive significance examines the goodness 
of fit of the whole equation. Here the pseudo-R2 of the first equation—including 
measures of the economy and institutions—suggests that jointly all the vari-
ables included in the equation improve the prediction of the dependent vari-
able nearly 13%. Of that 13%, minority religious divergence from the 
majority alone explains nearly 2% of the overall fit and institutional variance 
explains another 3%.25 Again the overall prediction of access to coalition for 
an ethnic minority is nearly equally affected by institutions and religion. We 
submit that from a minority political perspective this influence of religion on 
the overall fit of the equation is substantial.
Discussion and Conclusion
This article examined the effect of a minority constituency religion on the 
probability that a religious minority representative participates in the governing 
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coalition after the election. Our results show that contrary to the conception 
that people with different religious views do not get along, majority parties 
evidently make a special effort to reach out to minorities from different reli-
gious families when building executive coalitions. However, they do so only 
when the minority is represented through a minority party. This finding sug-
gests that the effort is strategic on the part of majority politicians. When 
appealing to minorities who belong to a different religious family, the major-
ity politician likely considers whether doing so will garner her or him credit 
among her or his own constituents for building bridges. To ensure that she or 
he receives such credit, the best strategy for the majority politician is to appeal 
to an entity that clearly represents the ethnic minority, that is, a minority party.
Access to the coalition is likely important to the minority for policy rea-
sons, but credit for including minorities may be equally important for the 
majority, particularly where minority issues are politically salient. Indeed, 
new research shows that vote choices are influenced by voters’ anticipation 
of postelection coalition politics (Dutch, May, & Armstrong, in press). If this 
is true, then publicly anticipated collaboration with culturally distinct minor-
ities would be a strategy of choice for majority parties who wish, for exam-
ple, to mobilize constituents in opposition to ethnocentric far-right parties. 
This is certainly plausible in West European politics after 1965, where eth-
nocentric far-right parties have claimed a fair share of the vote (Kitschelt, 
1995). Similarly, majority parties that have sympathized with ethnocentric 
nationalist parties have been known to use postelectoral collaboration with a 
culturally distinct minority to rehabilitate their own image in Eastern Europe 
(Birnir, 2007). Although religion is not the only minority characteristic that 
can accomplish this objective, it is certainly an important one.
These results also qualify the current literatures that discuss how religion 
translates into policy distance. First, we suggest that in addition to the impor-
tance of differences in orthodoxy and commitment (Broughton & Napel, 
2000; Gryzmala-Busse, 2001; Layman & Green, 2005), the type of religious 
divide (denomination vs. family) matters. It is important that we do not dis-
count the significance of orthodoxy. We do, however, suggest that this is not 
the only relevant religious division in politics today.
At the same time, our results qualify Higham’s (1955/2008) observations 
about early American politics and the more recent power-sharing literature 
where religion is considered one of the principal cultural differences used to 
mobilize competing parties. Specifically, the notion is that religious dis-
tance, both sectoral and between religious families, increases policy dis-
tance. In addition, the power-sharing literature promotes the solution of 
inclusion to ameliorate the conflict potential of this divide.
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Our results indicate that, consistent with these literatures, the type of reli-
gious divide has an effect on the perceived policy divide. Furthermore, some 
of this divide is overcome by inclusion of minorities in the government. It is 
interesting, however, that our second principal finding is that minorities who 
differ in denomination from the majority are less likely to join the governing 
coalition than are minorities at large. The remaining question, therefore, is 
why majority parties heed the power-sharing solution only with respect to 
minorities of different religious families and not those who diverge in 
denomination.
Recent findings in the broader literature about religion and politics high-
light the same difference in the probability of minority involvement in polit-
ical conflict depending on whether the minority differs from the majority in 
religious family or denomination. Specifically, the theoretical idea of “clash 
of civilizations”—that in part is religious—reverberated in the study of 
transnational politics (Fox, 2000, 2002; Huntington, 1996; Jelen & Wilcox, 
2002; Juergensmeyer, 2003; Seul, 1999; Stark, 2001). Consistent with our 
analysis, this idea has not borne out either locally or globally in empirical 
studies (Chiozza, 2002; Ellingsen, 2000; Fox, 2004; Gartzke & Gleditsch, 
2006; Gurr, 1994; Henderson, 2004, 2005; Henderson & Singer, 2000; 
Roeder, 2003; Russett, Oneal, & Cox, 2000; Tusicisny, 2004).26
However, Fox (2004, p. 9) finds support for the idea that religion affects 
domestic conflict as an intervening variable: There are other causes of con-
flict, but religion affects the process in several ways. Furthermore, and con-
sistent with our finding that probability of collaboration across a religious 
divide does not apply to groups who differ in denomination, Fox (2004, p. 66) 
finds that intrareligious clashes (between denominations) account for most of 
the increase in religious conflict that has occurred since 1980.
Why do minorities who diverge in religious family from majorities have 
greater access to governing coalitions than do minorities who diverge in 
denomination? And why are minorities who diverge in denomination more 
likely to engage the majority in conflict than are minorities who diverge in 
religious family? Perhaps groups belonging to different denominations within 
a country tend to be more equal in size than groups belonging to different 
religious families. Size equivalence might create a greater sense of political 
competition and reluctance to collaborate politically. Possibly, groups’ denom-
inational differences are more likely reinforced by other cleavages than are 
groups’ religious family differences. Alternatively, Satana, Inman, and Birnir 
(2012, forthcoming) suggest that religion possibly assumes greater political 
significance where it is the predominant or the only cultural characteristic that 
differentiates a minority from a majority. Maybe groups that differ in 
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denomination rather than religious family are more often crosscut by other 
cleavages, leaving religion as the overarching cleavage on which political 
mobilization takes place. We submit that these questions about the effect of the 
differences between divergent religious divides as they relate to a variety of 
political outcomes are fruitful venues for further study.
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Notes
 1. Focusing mostly on American politics, Wald and Wilcox (2006) explain that the 
absence of religion is particularly notable in empirical analyses, although the 
subject has experienced an upsurge in interest since the 1980s. However, with 
the exception of Jonathan Fox’s scholarship, it is fair to generalize that empirical 
analysis of the effects of religion is wanting in cross-national studies.
 2. There are exceptions such as Bolivia, but generally speaking the majority elects 
presidents.
 3. Furthermore, religion stabilizes votes in maturing democracies (Birnir, 2007; 
Norris & Inglehart, 2004).
 4. See “Israel Disqualifies” (2009).
 5. Representation, in turn, is, according to Cox (1997, p. 226), typically defined in 
terms of policy advocacy.
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 6. Under consociational arrangements, each social segment is included through a 
grand legislative coalition of political leaders. All segments also have mutual 
veto over policy and a high degree of autonomy, and legislators are elected 
through proportionality.
 7. The Lebanese consociational system functioned successfully over 30 years until 
the outset of the 1975 civil war.
 8. It is important that we do not observe invitations and rejections directly. The 
underlying assumption, therefore, is that the rate of access is a fair metric of the 
rate of invitation.
 9. The ability of ethnic minorities to access the government is arguably different 
from the ability of ethnic majority/plurality groups to do so. To hold constant as 
many such ethnic majority/minority differences as possible, our research design 
evaluates the impact only of religious family and denomination of one ethnic 
minority religion vis-à-vis the impact of religion for the control group of another 
ethnic minority. Consequently, our research design does not address the question 
of the absolute effect of religion (family and denomination) on the potential of 
an ethnic minority to access governing coalitions vis-à-vis all political constitu-
encies in a country, some of whom may be part of the ethnic majority but are 
represented by small parties.
10. The states where ethnic minority party access changed (minority was excluded 
or added) between elections are Bolivia, Bosnia, Finland, Nepal, Pakistan, 
South Korea, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and Switzerland. The states where minor-
ity inclusion through a nonethnic party changed between elections are Austria, 
Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, India, Israel, 
Macedonia, New Zealand, Romania, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Tur-
key, Thailand, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Venezuela.
11. Birnir’s universe of cases is based on the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data and 
includes coalition information for 70 groups in 39 democracies, from 1945 to 
2004. To isolate the effect of ethno-nationalism, Birnir excludes Muslims in 
India and Hindus in Bangladesh because MAR classifies these groups as reli-
gious groups. Both groups are electorally active, and we have added them to 
our data. Furthermore, Birnir surveys all electorally active ethnic minorities 
that she argues should be included in MAR because they meet all the criteria of 
large (more than 1% of the population or 100,000) “minorities at risk.” We have 
added the groups that we confirmed are electorally active. We also take ethnic 
representation in the cabinet through a nonethnic party as sufficient evidence of 
minority group mobilization. To keep with Birnir’s definition of democracy, we 
eliminated Fiji and Guyana.
12. In most cases we rely on a party’s self-definition for classification as ethnic. 
This coding is fairly straightforward. Some exceptions include Bulgaria where 
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ethnic parties have been illegal but the MRF is commonly recognized as the 
Turkish minority party. In the data set, MRF is coded as ethnic. Another prob-
lematic case includes the United Democratic Front (UDF) in Malawi, which 
has represented both the Yao and the Lomwe ethnic groups. In adding this case, 
we consulted Africa specialists John McAuley and Kim Dionne, who concur 
that the UDF is more like an ethnic party than a national pan-ethnic party. In 
addition, the party has recently split along ethnic lines with the UDF represent-
ing the Yao and the Democratic Progressive Party supported by the Lomwe. 
Consequently, we code the UDF as an ethnic party. So as not to overweigh the 
importance of Malawi, we count ethnic group access through the UDF only one 
time in any given year.
13. These are in most cases ministries, but there are exceptions such as the appoint-
ment of the Roma leader Gheorghe Raducanu to head the new office for Roma 
affairs after the 2000 election in Romania (Birnir, 2007).
14. Because of concerns about autocorrelation—as access between election years is 
the best predictor of access between election years—we reconfigured the origi-
nal annual data. Since there is no theoretical reason to believe access after elec-
tion T predicts minority group access after election T + 1, we count access once 
only for each election period.
15. One caveat is that the dependent variables accounting for access record only 
descriptive representation and not substantive representation. In no way does 
descriptive representation guarantee that substantive representation occurs 
(Wilkinson, 2004). However, recent cross-national analyses on women suggest 
that changes in descriptive representation do result in changes in policy initi-
ated and passed (Schwindt-Bayer, 2006). We posit that the effects of descriptive 
ethnic and religious representation remain to be studied further.
16. We have included Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the majority is Bosniak (Sunni 
Muslim) but Croats (Catholic) and Serbs (Orthodox) are minorities. In contrast, 
Fox classifies Bosnia and Herzegovina’s majority as “Islam, Other or Mixed.”
17. For further classification, see, for example, http://www.adherents.com/.
18. Although most groups in electoral democracies can be classified as having a pre-
dominant religion, very few minorities are primarily defined in religious terms.
19. In a few cases, Fox classifies the minority group as belonging to various denomi-
nations. In those cases we coded the combination variable as 0.
20. We used International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) 
database on electoral systems.
21. The line of reasoning here is the modernization thesis (Lipset, 1959).
22. This variable focuses on economic scarcity and relative deprivation (Cederman, 
Weidmann, & Gleditsch, in press; Gurr, 1985).
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23. The source for our economic variables is the Penn World Tables (Heston, Sum-
mers, & Aten, 2009). The 2003 values for Serbia-Montenegro are those listed for 
Montenegro, as the countries did not separate until 2006, but values are not given 
for Serbia in 2003.
24. See Long and Freese’s (2006, p. 211) “prchange.”
25. This interpretation reflects numbers in alternate specifications not reported here, 
where we excluded either the variables denoting religion or the variables denot-
ing institutions.
26. Authors testing both at the interstate and intrastate levels do find some associa-
tion between religion and conflict, but their theoretical expectations differ from 
Huntington’s (Ellingsen, 2000; Fox, 2002, 2004; Henderson, 1997; Seul, 1999; 
Tusicisny, 2004). Many scholars studying the subnational effect of religion hold 
that the content of religion is exogenous to the root causes of domestic political 
conflict (Chiozza, 2002; Henderson & Singer, 2000; Petito & Hatzopoulos, 2003; 
Russett, Oneal, & Cox, 2000; Varshney, 2002; Wilkinson, 2004).
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